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Abstract. This paper provides an overview of bundling, by explaining, in general, 
the different forms that this practice can take in selling, buying or exchanging goods. 
We then proceed with a linear programming formulation in health care, to explain 
how the price of a bundle of resources can be calculated. We follow this by looking 
at the specific case of the practice of bundling by Medicare, the social insurance 
system for health care in the United States. We consider its advantages, 
disadvantages, and various recommendations. 
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1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is first to provide an overview of the theory, practice, and 
policy implications of the bundling of transactions in goods and services as an 
instrument of price setting and discrimination, as discussed within a recent set of 
papers.2 We look at some specific economic policy examples of bundling directly 
applicable to this theory. Second, we are interested in explaining through a simple 
mathematical model how the price of a bundle of resources of a hospital can be 
formed. We also discuss specific examples of bundling in the health care market 
which is of wide interest and importance. 
The practice of bundling has increased rapidly, especially since the advent of 
e-commerce that has lead into an explosion of trade in information goods and 
services. This has created the need for controlling the activity within a clearly 
defined legal and regulatory system. 
The marked increase in bundling has lead to intensive research activity in the 
context of the theory of the firm. A number of models attempting to explain the 
economic principles involved and to predict the effects of bundling on profitability and 
the degree of competition has been set up. At the same time significant, from the point 
of view of their impact on the economy, real life applications of bundling have been 
considered by looking at the legal, regulatory, and competition framework within 
which this practice operates. 
An early theoretical investigation of bundling was done by Adams and Yellen 
(1976) in which, as we repeat in some detail below, they also compare pure with 
mixed bundling from the point of view of extracting consumer surplus. 
Bundling appears in many market forms. The practice of contract bundling by 
the U.S. government agencies is a good example of purchase bundling by a 
monopsonist. The Department of Defence in particular is the biggest bundler; it 
accounted for more than 65 percent of all bundling during the nineties. 
The paper on monopsonistic mixed bundling by Dassiou and Glycopantis 
(2008) helps to explain why this may have been trade enhancing for the suppliers as 
well as profit enhancing for the government. In fact, this becomes increasingly more 
beneficial for the trade volumes enjoyed by the former if it is not easy to ascertain 
the quality of the all the goods involved in the bundle. We refer to this issue again 
later in this section. 
We would like to explain that it falls outside the scope of this paper to review 
all the different proposed economic theories of bundling. This has been done by 
other authors, as for example by Kuhn (2004), who also discusses the role of 
bundling as an instrument of entry deterrence or product differentiation in the 
presence of competition. Rather, we use the papers by Dassiou et al. (2004) in which 
aspects of mixed bundling are discussed. In these papers bundling is seen as an 
                                                          
2
 Dassiou and Glycopantis (2005, 2006, 2008) and Dassiou et al. (2004). 
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instrument of price discrimination within the context of various policy applications. 
An innovative feature of our discussion is the derivation of the price of a 
bundle through a linear programming formulation of the problem of a hospital, with 
fixed quantities of resources providing health care. The solution of the dual problem 
gives a justification of the price asked of a health insurance company which is 
interested in buying the services of the resources as a bundle. 
A discussion of the practical implementation of bundling in the context of 
health care is also provided. We concentrate on bundling by Medicare, and we 
discuss advantages, disadvantages, and various recommendations. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some aspects of 
bundling and provides an overview of the different forms and types that it can take, 
by clarifying that bundling can encompass sell and buy, as well as both types of 
actions in the case of countertrade. Section 3 discusses how the price of a bundle can 
be obtained in the context of a linear programming problem, and Section 4 considers 
issues of bundling by Medicare, the U.S. governmental agency. Section 5 concludes 
the discussion with some remarks. 
 
2.  Aspects of the Theory of Bundling and Its Practice 
The typical form of bundling that the majority of the literature on bundling analyses, 
and can also be found in the majority of IO textbooks, is the case of a monopolist 
who bundles his goods to induce the buyers to buy the package. A familiar example 
is the bundling of articles in scientific journals, or, in turn, the bundling of journal 
subscriptions by publishers with the purpose of capturing the mean valuations of 
academics for a package of articles and journals; this facilitates the capturing of 
consumer surplus by the publisher since the bundling will reduce the dispersion in 
valuations unless the latter are perfectly correlated. 
Bundling of services as set by the seller is also taking place in the case of 
airline travelling as this may includes inboard food, checked bags, check-in, and 
handling costs. More recently, the growth of internet flight booking has allowed 
many airlines to include in the package ancillary services such as hotels, car rental, 
and travel insurance booking, as they earn a commission from selling such services 
by third-party providers. On the other hand, it is important to point out that instances 
of unbundling can also occur as in the case of low-cost carriers. For example, 
Ryanair has recently unbundled its services by charging separately for inboard food, 
checked bags, and has more recently considered charging passengers for using the 
toilets on board its aircraft! It also plans to abolish facilities at airports by forcing all 
passengers to check-in on line and print off their own boarding passes before getting 
to the airport. 
Unbundling of activities is also occurring in regulated utility industries. In the 
EU market for gas and electricity, there is a requirement of vertically unbundling the 
ownership or the operations of transmission networks owned by generation or energy 
supply companies. This has long been an unresolved issued despite numerous EU 
directives pointing to this direction over the last ten years. Such unbundling is seen 
50     The Journal of Economic Asymmetries      September 2009 
 
 
as a vital step for the development of competition within EU energy markets, and 
was only agreed to in 2008 by European ministers. Firms will be required to either 
sell their transmission networks or lease them to independent operators. 
Another example of bundling is the practice by companies such as British Sky 
Broadcasting, Virgin Media, and more recently Carphone Warehouse, to sell bundles 
of services including phone, broadband and television services. (See Thanassoulis, 
2008, on triple-play offers and its implications for consumers). BT received a boost 
from the regulator's recent decision (March 2009) to allow it to also offer such a 
bundle, whereas before, although it could sell such services separately, it was not 
allowed to market them as a single-bundle price item. 
What all of the above examples share in common is that we have a price-
setting seller offering the bundle. However, as argued in Dassiou et al. (2004) 
bundling does not only take the form of selling by a price-setting firm. It can also 
take the form of countertrade which can be interpreted as transaction bundling of one 
sell and one buy transaction between two partners, typically between a firm in a 
developed country (DC) and a trading partner in a less developed country (LDC). 
In particular, while barter exchange can alleviate or resolve problems of 
creditworthiness from the side of the LDC (Marin and Schnitzer, 2002) and buyback 
contracts resolve problems of quality uncertainty in the case of technological 
transfers from a firm in a DC to a company in a LDC (Choi and Maldoom, 1992), 
countertrade can also act as a form of transaction bundling that allows the Western 
firm to price discriminate between potential trading partners. At the same time, it 
alleviates adverse selection regarding the uncertain quality of the good sold by the 
LDC firm. 
By offering the opportunity to bundle its transactions, the DC firm can 
effectively enhance its ability to identify desirable trading partners and also engage 
in price discrimination. More importantly, barter does appear as a special case in 
exchange bundling. Dassiou et al. (2004) set the conditions under which offering this 
is optimal for the DC firm. 
Finally, many procurement decisions take the form of bundling purchases. 
The firm will be willing to offer higher prices when bundling, and even more so if 
this allows it to resolve an adverse selection problem, if quality in any of the goods is 
uncertain. Just as it is profitable for a monopolist to offer mixed bundling at a bundle 
price which is lower than the sum of the individual prices (hence exploiting the 
'average willingness to pay'), it is equally profitable for a monopsonist to offer a 
bundled purchase price which is higher than the individual prices being offered 
(hence exploiting the 'average willingness to sell'). 
Senate bills have been passed to control the practice of bundling in 
government procurement, while the Financial Services Authority and its counterpart 
across the Atlantic are at the final stages of forming policies that will regulate 
bundling in brokerage services and control the activity to the benefit of the society. 
Another example is a health insurance company. Through its buying power 
over hospitals, it obtains the ability to control the physician fees despite the fact that 
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it lacks monopsony power over the physicians themselves directly, as argued in 
Blackstone and Fuhr (1996). 
An early model of bundling is described in Adams and Yellen (1976). They 
define three different pricing strategies that a firm with monopoly power can pursue: 
(i) pricing and selling goods separately (pure components pricing); (ii) offering them 
as a bundle only (pure bundling); (iii) mixed bundling by selling the goods both 
individually and as a bundle. They identify as the chief defect of pure bundling its 
inability to comply with what they refer to as the condition of exclusion according to 
which no individual is allowed to consume a good which he or she values less that its 
marginal cost. 
On the other hand, they argue that while mixed bundling still faces a tradeoff 
between more extraction of consumer surplus and more complete exclusion, it does 
so to a much smaller degree than pure bundling does. The use of mixed bundling as 
an effective mechanism for the extraction of consumer surplus is examined in a 
number of papers such as Stigler (1968), Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee 
(1984), McAfee et al. (1989) and Salinger (1995). 
Mixed bundling allows the firm to set individual component prices in a way 
that buyers, who value one of the two goods below its cost, cease to consume it 
while they continue to consume the other good which they value above cost. By 
setting the individual component prices properly, this practise ensures that mixed 
bundling is at least as profitable as pure bundling (Adams and Yellen, p. 483, 
footnote 12). On the other hand, if marginal costs are high, then pure components 
pricing will be more profitable than mixed bundling, as the cost of excluding 
customers in mixed bundling becomes too costly in terms of forgone consumer 
surplus. 
Apart from the articles mentioned earlier on the use of mixed bundling, there 
has also been a number of articles on the bundling of information goods, first 
discussed by Varian (1985) and subsequently in a series of contributions by Bakos 
and Brynjolfsson (1998, 1999, 2000). These focus on the bundling of goods with low 
marginal costs. Such goods make mixed bundling a much more profitable strategy 
for firms relative to individual pricing as the possible inefficient consumption by 
customers who value one of the component goods less than its marginal cost is 
drastically reduced. In other words, satisfying the Adams and Yellen condition of 
exclusion is no longer an issue. 
If the motive behind bundling is price discrimination, then this strategy is 
optimal for the firm independently of the existence of complementarities between the 
goods in the bundle (as discussed in Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002, and Lucking-
Reiley, 2000). If anything, the existence of the latter would reinforce this result by 
creating an additional motive for bundling. 
The profit-enhancing impact of bundling in the case where the goods bundled 
have independent valuations is examined by McAfee et al. (1989). They note that 
when the reservation values of the two goods are independently distributed, mixed 
bundling is always locally optimal relative to pure components pricing. 
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Bundling has already been shown to be profit enhancing by Schmalensee (1984) 
by reducing the effective dispersion of the reservation prices in a Gaussian demand 
environment, based on the fact that standard deviations of bundles are always sub-
additive unless the goods in the bundle are perfectly correlated.3 However bundling in 
that paper is based on the conventional combination of one unit of each good. 
By Schmalensee's admission, if symmetry (in terms of values of the dispersion of 
the two goods by each being equal to half of the sum of the dispersion) does not hold, 
bundling is less likely to be profit- or welfare-enhancing. Hence, if the weight that each 
of the two goods receives in the bundle can be manipulated, then this may effectively 
resolve this problem without having to resort to a mixed bundling approach. 
Moreover, a reduction in dispersion is not always profitable, but rather when 
marginal costs are low relative to the mean valuation. On the other hand, when 
marginal costs are high, the seller will want to increase, rather than decrease the 
dispersion of valuations because, if the marginal costs are greater than the mean 
valuation, bundling will decrease profits by decreasing the fraction of buyers with a 
mean valuation in excess of the marginal cost of the bundle. 
For the case of a positive correlation, Nalebuff (2004) points out the 
superiority of pure bundling relative to mixed bundling as an instrument of entry 
deterrence. In mixed bundling the monopolist will have to charge very high 
individual prices to avoid having an emerging rival with one product to use the 
incumbent's other product to create a rival bundle that will steal away the established 
firm's bundled sales. But since such high prices mean that individual items will 
generate few additional sales, there is little point to offer mixed bundling in the first 
place. Hence we would not normally expect to observe mixed bundling in the 
presence of an entry threat. 
A rather weak point in the above reasoning is that Nalebuff argues that the 
price discrimination effect of pure bundling results in limited increases in profits by 
offering a discount relative to the original component prices, while the main gain 
comes from the magnitude of the reduction in the potential profits of an entrant, 
thereby increasing the probability of entry deterrence. However, the modest profit 
increase that he refers to is that of pure bundling relative to pure component pricing. 
This ignores the fact that the profit increase can be much more substantial if there is 
a move from pure component pricing into mixed bundling. The difference in the 
magnitude between these two different types of profit gains needs to be considered, 
that is, the cost of choosing pure rather than mixed bundling, and then be traded off 
against the gains from entry deterrence accruing from pure bundling. 
In other words, the distortion of bundling for strategic purposes will lead to anti-
competitive effects and also forgone profits resulting from the choice of pure over mixed 
bundling. For this reason we argue in Dassiou and Glycopantis (2006) that regulation and 
competition authorities should focus on trying to stop bundling being used as an 
                                                          
1=
3
 In other words, unless the correlation in the reservation values between the demand for the 
two goods is equal to 1 (  ), .< 21  B  
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instrument of entry deterrence, rather than trying to ban bundling altogether. 
As mentioned, the novelty of the papers by Dassiou et al. (2004) has been that 
rather than looking at bundling in terms of a monopolist arrangement only, we 
consider three distinct possibilities. We analyze transactions bundling in the cases of 
monopoly, monopsony, and exchange (organized by a price-setting firm which is both a 
monopolist and a monopsonist). The common result is the local optimality of the 
bundling of transactions from the point of view of expected profits for the price-setting 
firm, and the overall increase in the level of trade in the goods bundled. 
Contrary to the analysis by Nalebuff (2004) we assume no complementarity 
between the goods bundled. This removes the possibility of the use of bundling for 
strategic purposes, i.e., as an instrument of foreclosure,4 retaining the use of 
bundling for short-run profit maximizing purposes alone, as practised by an 
uncontested price-setting company. 
                                                          
What is considered instead, for the cases of exchange and monopsonistic 
bundling (Dassiou et al., 2004, Dassiou and Glycopantis, 2008), is the issue of 
varying degrees of adverse selection (what we refer to as partner preference), and 
more specifically the benefits arising from bundling not only in terms of the increase 
in the profits of the firm that sets the prices, but also in terms of enhancing the 
volume of trade in goods with some degree of uncertain quality. 
The reason why the enhancement in the volume of trade emerges in these two 
papers as a separate issue is obvious. In the standard case of mixed bundling in 
monopoly, the resulting increase in the volume of trade translates  into an increase in the 
profits of the price-setting firm. In the case of exchange and monopsony, gains in the 
volume of trade are also experienced by the trading partners of the price-setting company. 
While Nalebuff (2004) and Salinger (1995) discuss bundling in terms of 
creating a more valuable product by tying two complementary goods as one, the 
Dassiou et al. (2004) and Dassiou and Glycopantis (2008) papers, by looking at 
exchange and monopsony respectively, show how the bundling of transactions helps 
price takers to resolve the problem of quality uncertainty in the good(s) that they sell. 
Bundling, as we see, increases the volume of trade; this increase is enhanced 
considerably if the purchase of a good with low quality certainty is bundled with 
another transaction, buy or sell, of a good with a substantially higher degree of 
quality certainty. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper which looks at bundling a 
product of established quality with one of unknown quality as a means of mitigating 
the problem of asymmetric information is the one by Choi (2003). He interprets 
bundling as a way to leverage information and signal quality, and finds that it is 
profitable when the quality of the one product is known while the quality of the other 
is unknown. 
The paper on exchange bundling (Dassiou et al., 2004) concurs with Choi's 
finding; the difference is that, in the two, products are sold by two different 
4
 Carlton and Waldam (2002) examine the use of pure bundling of complementary goods, in 
the form of tying, in order to prevent entry into the market. 
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companies. The seller of the good of certain quality is the price-setting monopolist in 
a developed country. He mix-bundles this sale with the monopsonistic purchase of a 
good of uncertain quality produced by a company in a less developed country. We 
find that bundling of a (sell, buy) transaction is profit-enhancing, unless either the 
marginal cost of producing the good sold is extremely high (i.e., equal to one), or if 
the certainty component in the quality of the good bought is zero. 
Choi argues that bundling is never profitable if consumers either know the 
quality of both goods or they are not certain of the quality of either. The monopsony 
paper by Dassiou and Glycopantis (2008) concurs this latter finding but refutes the 
former. The finding by Choi is not common in the literature. It is the result of the 
restrictive assumption that the monopolist faces identical customers. Dassiou and 
Glycopantis (2008), on the other hand, in common with the majority of other 
authors, assume different types of trading partners. Hence mixed bundling in our 
model is superior, even if both goods are of certain quality, as it reduces the 
dispersion in the valuations (unobservable by the price-setter) of the sellers. In 
general, it is optimal for the price-setting monopolist to mix-bundle the purchase of 
two goods together, (relative to now bundling), unless the value of the certainty 
component in the quality of either or both goods is zero. The difference is that Choi 
talks about a conventional model of bundling by a selling firm producing two goods. 
He shows that the bundling of a good whose quality information is imperfect 
with a product whose quality can be fully ascertained can act as a signal of quality 
for the former good. Interestingly he also argues that  this practice of pure bundling 
may seriously backfire if the weakest-link good degrades the performance of the 
high-quality good when consumed together. As an example of this, he discusses 
Merill Lynch's experience with its Cash Management Account. 
This account was basically a bundling of financial services by permitting card 
and check withdrawals from an investment account. It was therefore an attempt to 
enter retail banking by bundling the characteristics of a current account to those of an 
investment account. Merill Lynch encountered significant operational problems with 
its account because of the time-consuming customer enquiries directed to its brokers. 
The company eventually had to hire several hundred clerks for the programme. In 
essence the adding of this cheque and card facilities degraded, rather than enhanced, 
the value of its investment account. 
On the other hand, Dassiou and Glycopantis (2008) look instead at a 
monopsonist's arranged mixed bundle and deduce that the larger the difference in the 
degree of quality uncertainty between the two goods is, the larger will be the 
improvement in the volume of trade for the good with the higher degree of quality 
uncertainty relative to no bundling. At the extreme case where the quality of one of 
the goods bundled can be fully ascertained, the increase in the volume of trade for 
the other one is maximized. This maximum value is larger the higher the degree of 
quality uncertainty in this second good. Hence, packaging the transactions of two 
goods that are independent of each other and of different qualities induces an 
increase in the volume of trade for both goods and especially in the one with the high 
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degree of quality uncertainty. 
Furthermore, for the price-setting monopsonist there will be an improvement 
in profits relative to no bundling unless, as in Choi, the degree of quality certainty in 
either or both goods is equal to zero. This improvement in expected profits will be 
greater, the smaller the difference in the degree of quality uncertainty between the 
two goods purchased is. 
DeGraba (2005) deals with a risk-averse monopolist who prices closer to 
marginal cost when demand is uncertain in order to secure this demand as it is 
considered riskier that many small buyers. Dependence on a larger buyer creates 
higher uncertainty, and hence the risk-averse seller seeks to avoid this by offering a 
lower price to such a large buyer than the price demanded from smaller buyers. 
Obviously the relevance of such a paper in the context of bundling is two-fold: 
firstly, it offers an explanation for the tendency by the government to bundle its 
purchases as an attempt to improve its bargaining power and secure a better deal 
from a price-setting monopolist, and secondly it explains why the seller wishes to 
offer the bundle at a discount other than the price discrimination reason. 
Crampes and Hollander (2005) look at bundles in pay-TV programme content 
provision and find that a firm is likely to offer two bundles in order to increase 
profits when the majority of preferences over one type of programming is strong and 
when the gap in consumer preferences is large. When two distinct bundles are 
offered to subscribers, only one of them will contain all channels while the other will 
be a subset of the former. Hence we have the typical case where there is a basic 
service open to all subscribers, and then additional channels are offered to those 
willing to pay a premium. This achieves screening, by versioning, and allows the full 
extraction of the consumer surplus from those with the highest willingness to pay. 
Essentially this paper introduces both the idea of weighting, (for example, 
how many  type 1 (good 1) and how many type 2 (good 2) channels should be in the 
bundle), as well as the possibility of offering alternative bundles where some have a 
full coverage and some partial cover. We take up this second theme in the modelling 
section below, by considering different packages, (full and partial), of illnesses 
coverage in the case of hospitals. The weighting of the scarce resources comes from 
the solution of the dual problem. 
 
 
3.  An Application of Linear Programming 
We discuss here how the price of a bundle can be formed through the solution of a 
mathematical model. The idea is that there is a hospital with fixed quantities of 
factors of production, doctors, nurses, beds, and medicine, and can accept patients 
who suffer from heart problems, cancer, stroke, or a common cold. The hospital can 
admit directly patients who pay a given price for a fixed period of treatment, or it can 
come to an agreement with a health insurance company which is prepared to pay a 
price for the bundle of all, or part of, the available resources. The insurance company 
makes a profit by collecting a premium from people who are risk averse and wish to 
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insure themselves against such an illness. 
The hospital is faced, first, with the problem of maximizing total revenue 
subject to feasibility constraints. 
 
 The primal problem: 
Maximize 44332211= xpxpxpxpR   
subject to: 
                  dqxaxaxaxa  414313212111  
                 nqxaxaxaxa  424323222121  
                 bqxaxaxaxa  434333232131  
                 mqxaxaxaxa  444343242141  
                                 0.,,, 4321 xxxx
Interpretation of the primal; variables and relations: 
For simplicity we assume divisibility of the factors of production. In a particular 
period the hospital can admit: 
1x  number of heart patients, each paying , 1p
2x  number of cancer patients, each paying , 2p
3x  number of stroke patients, each paying , 3p
4x  number of common cold patients, each paying . 4p
The prices that will prevail and the number of patients to be attracted are in 
expectation form and therefore R  denotes the expected profit. The factors of 
production available to the hospital during the same period are: 
dq , the quantity of doctor-hours available, (Resource 1), 
nq , the quantity of nurse-hours available, (Resource 2), 
bq , the quantity of bed-hours available, (Resource 3), 
mq  the quantity of medicine available (Resource 4). 
With respect to the technological coefficients,  denotes the non-negative 
units of resource i required per unit of patient of type j. Therefore the technological 
constraints express the fact that it is not possible to allocate more than the available 
quantities of the factors of production. We also have the feasibility constraint that the 
number of patients of each type must be non-negative. Of course, some of the s 
could well be zero. For example, it is possible that the treatment of common cold 
does not require that the patient stay in a hospital bed for any period. The set of 
constraints is assumed to define a feasible set, and therefore a solution exists. It is 
ija
ija
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denoted by  patients of each type that the hospital would like 
to attract ideally, and the revenue that it would like to make. The formulation above 
is the usual one in economics for finding the optimum of an objective function 
subject to feasibility constraints. Problems in linear programming come in pairs and 
every one has its dual. The formulation of the latter uses the variables attached to the 
constraint of the primal. This is well known. 
),,,,,( *4*3*2*1* xxxxR
nd qrqrC 21=
 
 The dual problem: 
Minimize mb qrqr 43   
subject to: 
                14413 prar 31221111 arara 
32222112 arara 
33223113 arara 
34224114 arara 
1r
               24423 prar 
                34433 prar 
                44443 prar 
                              0.,,, 432 rrr
Interpretation of the dual; variables and relations: 
The economic interpretation of the dual is, of course, related to the physical 
problem described in the primal, especially since their optimal values must be 
identical. Here, we create a shadow market for the factors of production where ri is the 
required, non-negative, accounting price of resource i, i.e., its weight, and we mimic 
the competitive solution. The objective function expresses the fact that we wish to 
minimize the total cost of hiring the fixed factors of production in the shadow market 
by observing at the same time the competitive equilibrium conditions. 
Each of the constraints refers to a particular type of patient and expresses the 
requirement that in the production of the corresponding services marginal cost must 
be greater or equal to marginal revenue. Marginal cost for each type of patients is 
expressed by summing up the factor requirements times the corresponding shadow 
price and marginal revenue by the price pi. In the case where marginal cost is greater 
than marginal revenue the corresponding type of patient is not admitted in the 
hospital as this would be very expensive. These are the classical competitive 
equilibrium first order conditions. 
We are trying to allocate the total expected profit to the scarcity of the factors 
of production. Let the solution of the dual be . We have ),,,,( 4321 rrrrC *****
i
i q
R
r  ** =  
where . Each partial derivative denotes the per unit contribution of the 
respective factor of production to the maximum 
},,, mbnd{i 
*
= RR . Therefore this is a signal as 
to what resource new investment should be directed to. 
The duality theorem implies that . Based on this fact, we can create a ** = CR
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bundle of resources at the maximum price *R  or . It is precisely the solution of the 
dual problem that gives the competitive value, as calculated by the hospital, of the 
bundle of resources. Below we consider a number of negotiating circumstances 
between the hospital and the insurance company. 
*C
 
Case 1. The Hospital and the Insurance Company negotiate over the whole 
package of resources. 
Everything is in expectation. Therefore, on the one hand, the hospital can 
profit from securing the expected profit, *R , in advance, and the insurance company 
can argue about the amount of money demanded for the whole bundle of resources. 
The insurance company can profit if there is a sufficient number of risk averse 
individuals prepared to pay a sufficiently high premium for complete cover. For 
simplicity we assume there is only one type of such individuals. 
Figure 1 shows that a risk-averse individual is prepared to pay a premium 
which is larger than the expected loss.  denotes wealth at the current state of 
health and  the level following an illness.  is the expected loss in wealth, 
due to the probable illness, and G  the insurance premium that a risk-averse 
individual is prepared to pay to obtain coverage. The fact that  allows the 
insurance company to operate and make a profit. As the individual insures himself 
against a number of alternative illnesses, we can assume that  is an average 
expected loss which can occur with a given probability. 
0W
IW 0 )(LE
)(> LEG
)(LE
The insurance company is asking the hospital to accept, for the whole bundle, 
a lower amount *r . This is based on its own estimation of future prices and profit. 
We suppose that the hospital considers *r  sufficient, if not optimal, to justify its 
operations. Therefore there is an amount **R  r  to be divided, and this depends on 
the bargaining power of the two sides. Figure 1 depicts the case where the 
middleman between the hospital and the patient has more bargaining power. 
One way to proceed is to assume that bargaining takes place between the two 
parties. We can, for example, invoke from game theory the axiomatic Nash 
bargaining solution, (Nash, 1950), of the problem below: 
   
Problem:  
Maximize    21= yyU
subject to:  
   
**
21 rRyy 
0,, 21 yy  
where  is the amount of the difference between 1y
**
rR   to be allocated to the 
insurance company,   to the hospital, and 2y , summing up to one, denote the 0, 
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Figure 1 : A Risk-averse Individual: Premium> Excepted loss 
 
   
   
 
     
respective bargaining power. This depends on whether the parties like bargaining, 
their psychological urge to settle, how relatively more important profit is rather than 
serving the community, etc. Figure 2 presents the case where the hospital has less 
bargaining power. The solution gives the bundle price, , that is agreed on for 
the resources. The insurance company has avoided paying an extra  for securing 
the bundle of resources. 
*
2
* yr 
*
1y
We note that in the above formulation we have taken the status-quo payoffs to be 
equal to zero. This assumption means that if negotiations break down, both the hospital 
and the insurance receive zero income. It would be more realistic to assume that the 
hospital still makes a positive income , which will be its status-quo payoff. This would 
be lower than 
*S
*R  because the prices will be affected from the fact that negotiation were 
entered into unsuccessfully. The mathematical formulation of the problem would be, of 
course, easy to adjust. 
Alternatively, without invoking the strict axiomatic approach of Nash, we can 
divide ** rR   between the two parties according to some agreed to proportions 
expressing the behavioural attitudes of the two parties in desiringe to settle and to 
make a profit. A bounded rationality argument can determine these proportions, 
without the need to invoke a set of axioms to support the decisions of the agents. 
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Figure 2: The Insurance Company Has More Bargaining Power. 
 
 
 
Case 2. The Hospital and the Insurance Company negotiate on payment over 
a percentage of the whole package of resources. 
This could correspond to the case where the hospital is not just a profit 
pursuing organization, but it also wishes to observe social norms and serve the 
community. In particular, the exclusion from bundling of cases involving patients 
with severe conditions may remove one of the disadvantages of bundling in health 
care discussed below. Such exemptions, combined with the setting of targets on 
health outcomes, will reduce the tendency to economize by avoiding accepting very 
serious, and therefore, costly cases. On the other hand, the insurance company might 
have established through market research that there is a substantial number of people who 
are optimistic about their future state of health, ready to take a risk. Therefore, they would 
not be prepared to pay a reasonable premium for health insurance. It might also be the 
case that, although risk-averse, the market is not big enough to bear the burden of 
securing the payment to the hospital and making a reasonable profit. 
A way forward is as follows: Let   be the percentage of the bundle of 
resources under negotiation. The hospital solves again the primal problem and asks 
for a payment of , the insurance company offers  and we are faced, in terms 
of negotiations, with a reduced version of the negotiation problem of Case 1. 
*R *r
Case 3. The Hospital and the Insurance Company negotiate over part of the 
package of resources. 
We wish to discuss the case where the hospital is not supplying all types of 
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medical activities. This occurs when, for example, the insurance company does not 
want to cover all people who might catch a common cold. In the opposite case, the 
premium might have to be reduced because most people will probably believe that 
they will simply catch a cold. Also, the hospital might wish, or be expected by the 
National Health Service, which would be an external constraint on the problem, to 
treat this type of patient. In this case the hospital solves again the primal linear 
programming problem above and asks from the insurance company the amount 
. The latter offers  and we have in a reduced form the 
problem of Case 1. The original primal problem is solved because if the hospital 
were to withhold resources and then solve the sub-problem that would emerge, it 
could not obtain a larger solution than 
*
33
*
22
*
11
*
= xpxpxpP  *p
*R . 
We cannot do any better by dividing the problem into smaller linear 
programming sub-problems. The hospital could not obtain a larger solution than *R  
because in the end the overall constraint on the resources must be satisfied. Of 
course, it must take into account that not all of *P  will be secured. On the other 
hand, all sums are in expectation, and what is described here is one way of 
proceeding. 
In the discussion above, we have used an example from health economics, in 
the form a linear programming problem, to explain how the price of a bundle can be 
determined. Obviously, this type of problems can also be formulated in the context 
of other areas in economics, and analogous results concerning bundles and their 
prices can be obtained. 
 
 
4.  Applications from Health Economics and Health Care Systems; Medicare 
We shall now discuss bundling in the health-care market. Because of the relative 
availability of sources, we concentrate on Medicare, the insurance system in the 
United States which offers coverage to certain groups of people.5 It acts as a buyer, 
with monopsonistic powers, of the services provided by hospitals. 
 
Bundling in health care: 
In every health-care system, insurance plays a significant role. Since Arrow's (1963) 
pioneering work on the health-care market, a systematic effort has been made to 
understand the economic and behavioural factors which drive the dynamics of health 
insurance. Health insurance systems around the world are faced with a number of 
challenges, including the ageing of the population, new medical technologies, and 
increased patients’ expectations (Waters et al., 2008). 
The bundling of care has been discussed as a way of improving efficiency in 
health services. By bundling payment in the context of health care we mean payment 
by episode of care, rather than payment for individual services. For example, an 
                                                          
5
 The provision of health care coverage in an economy is important for the population 
longevity and general quality of life, (see Sen, 2009). 
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insurance package pays a fixed amount to hospitals for knee replacements which 
include, as a bundle, both acute and post-acute care, instead of paying separately for 
hospital stay, doctors, nurses, and medication needed. 
The U.S. health system, in particular, has struggled for decades to maintain 
efficiency and fairness under Medicare, a social insurance programme administered by 
the government to provide health coverage to people who are aged 65 and over, or who 
meet other special criteria. This creates significant pressure to identify ways to decrease 
costs, increase efficiency and provide broader coverage of the insured population. The 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission in its recent report to Congress discuss 
extensively bundling payment reforms as an effective way to promote the effectiveness 
and efficiency of Medicare in the United States (MedPAC, 2008). Yet, bundling in health 
care is a relative new approach in health insurance systems, and its implementation has 
been limited to only a few pilot schemes designed by Medicare. 
Below we discuss a number of advantages and disadvantages that the debate 
on bundling has identified, as well as the lessons that have been learned from the 
implementation of bundling. 
 
Advantages of Bundled Health Care: 
One of the main advantages of bundling in the health care context is that bumdling 
can eliminate unnecessary services and consequently reduce costs. Providers have an 
incentive to decrease the number of physician services that are not needed during 
hospitalisation, use them in a more appropriate way, and reduce post-acute care and 
readmissions. Indeed, it has been estimated that Medicare spends $ 12 billion on 
readmissions that could be prevented (MedPAC 2008). 
The current fee-for-service (FFS) system pays providers a prospective amount 
for services based on the expected cost of these services, and therefore, by providing 
more services, such as more admissions, longer stays and more tests, some of which 
could be avoided, hospitals increase their income. For example, Medicare pays 
hospitals per length of stay, so that the cost of admission is the same with the cost of 
readmission. It therefore provides no incentive to the hospital to avoid readmissions. 
While fee-for-service payments reward more care, a bundled payment method 
incentivizes providers to better allocation of care. The limited evidence on bundling 
payment in the United States confirms a number of positive effects that the programme 
has had on reduction of spending. Most evidence comes from the Health Care Financing 
Administration’s (HCFA) Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration. 
The programme included a bundling payment for coronary artery bypass graft at four 
hospitals in the United States and ran between 1991 and 1996. 
The study by Cromwell et al. (1997) evaluating the programme finds a 15.5 
percent decrease in Medicare spending between 1991-1993, saving $ 17.2 million to 
Medicare, of which the greatest proportion was in-patient savings. A study by Wynn 
(2001) shows that the savings from bundling totalled 52.3 million, of which $ 42.3 
million was due to discounts negotiated with the hospitals and 7.9 million was 
$
$
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from reduced co-payments. 
A more recent implementation of the bundling system in the U.S. health-care 
market was the “ProvenCareSM” programme implemented by the Geisinger Health 
System in 2006. ProvenCareSM included a bundling payment system for all non-
emergency coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) procedures and was accompanied 
by a pay-for-performance process (Paulus et al. 2008). The bundle price included the 
estimated cost of a typical hospitalisation and ninety days of post-acute care. 
A study by Casale et al. (2007) looking at the scheme shows that, indeed, the 
programme led to a better provider compliance to the guidelines and dropped hospital 
costs by 5 percent. It also shows that the length of stay, as well as the readmission rates, 
declined significantly. The success of the scheme led Geisinger Health System to expand 
bundling to hip-replacement surgery and also considering expansion in to knee 
replacement, cataract surgery and other conditions (Miller 2008). 
In addition to reducing spending by controlling readmissions, providers have 
an incentive to reduce unnecessary physician services during the hospitalization or 
switch from doctors to nurses to reduce costs when appropriate. Also, physicians are 
driven to use fewer resources during an in-patient stay and use cheaper alternatives 
to therapies, for example, generic drugs instead of branded ones, or low-tech services 
instead of high-tech which are equally effective. 
Finally, patients may benefit from sharing the savings resulting from reduced 
service utilization and costs (RAND, 2008). This advantage becomes more obvious 
when patients have to pay part of the cost of treatment. 
 
Disadvantages 
However, the bundled payment method is not without considerable limitations and 
potential problems. First, there is a danger that a bundling payment system will 
generate unwanted incentives to providers to increase their income or eliminate costs 
in undesirable ways. For example, given that providers are paid by episode of care, 
they may increase admissions to hospitals as a way of increasing income, even in 
situations when the patient could be treated on an outpatient basis. Also, along with 
reduction in unnecessary services to eliminate costs, there is the danger that hospitals 
may also reduce necessary services. This creates concerns regarding the impact of 
the system on health outcomes. 
In general, the implementation of bundling payment methods should in theory 
improve health outcomes of patients. Providers have an incentive to coordinate better 
with each other, to use different resources and to reduce the probability of re-
admission and unnecessary hospitalization. However, if the target is only cost-
containment, there is the danger that providers may cut down on not only 
unnecessary care but also appropriate care. In this case health outcomes may be 
reduced.  There is also the danger of selection bias if severity of the condition is not 
taken into consideration. Bundling payment is based on average costs, and hospitals 
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may avoid accepting sicker, and therefore more costly patients.6 
Evidence on the impact of bundling on health outcomes is limited and 
therefore does not allow for generalizations to be made. Casale et al. (2007) find that 
adverse effects declined among patients who were part of the bundling scheme in 
comparison to those patients who were treated a year prior to its implementation in 
2005. Yet, patients in the study were admitted for elective CABGs and so tended to 
be healthier than the general population of patients with the same condition, and the 
sample was too small to allow generalization of results. To avoid unwanted 
consequences in health outcomes strict quality of care standards needs to be set by 
the authorities. 
The impact of bundling on patient experience is not known. In theory, there 
may be a positive effect due to better coordination between providers, but there is 
concern that doctors may be forced to spend less time with their patients as a result 
of an effort to see more patients and reduce cost. This is likely to affect patients’ 
satisfaction levels. An additional limitation is that because of disparities in the 
financial performance among hospitals, some hopitals may be able to pay physicians 
higher rates than some others can. That may lead hospitals to redirect money from 
other sources, such as nursing, to physicians in order to offer attractive compensation 
arrangements. Other limitations concern implementation in a broader scale. 
Bundling has been proven useful in reducing costs and increasing savings in a 
number of conditions, but it may be less easy to implement the system when the duration 
of the illness is less clearly defined, such as in chronic conditions (e.g., diabetes). 
Operational changes are needed to implement bundling payment. The 
complexity of the episode care may make it difficult for physicians and hospitals to 
decide on the most appropriate way of managing the care and sharing the bundling 
payment (Berenson et al., 2006; Budetti et al., 2002). This is done ad hoc per case. A 
number of decisions need to be made, including which conditions can be part of the 
scheme, the severity of the patients considered for participation, ways to achieve the 
most efficient bundles and mechanisms than ensure that appropriate measure is taken 
to avoid the danger of reduced health outcomes. That involves the danger of conflicts 
of interest among the different parties, such as doctors, hospital managers, and 
commissioners. Similar conflicts may occur when the determination and distribution 
of payments is discussed. 
 
Recommendations 
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC 2008), in view of the 
potential drawbacks that the implementation of a bundling system has, proposes a 
number of recommendations to make its implementations more effective. First, it 
suggests that information concerning service use around hospitalization episodes 
should be disclosed to hospitals and physicians, to allow them to compare their 
performances relative to that of others and to examine how well they are doing in 
                                                          
6
 If the patients had to pay their cost of treatment that would have been a problem of adverse 
selection. 
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readmission rates. It suggests that this measure, which will help physicians and 
hospitals to reduce their service use, be first disclosed to hospitals and physicians 
only and then the information be made available to the public. 
Second, it proposes that for the first measure to work, it should be 
implemented along with financial incentives. That would include Medicare reducing 
the payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates for selected 
conditions. This would also allow hospitals to share the savings from episode care 
treatment, by reducing the cost below the Medicare bundle payment. 
Third, to fully understand the potential practical problems that might occur 
from the implementation of a bundling payment system, the Committee suggests the 
creation of a pilot programme to test the feasibility of the system, initially in a 
number of conditions. This study would identify the potential problems of the 
method and will suggest whether it is feasible to extend the system to more 
conditions under Medicare. To avoid the danger of reduced health outcomes due to 
reduction of appropriate care in order to decrease costs, it is important to set targets 
to maintain health outcomes. Also, the scheme needs to take into account the severity 
of the condition as sicker patients may be avoided for being financially riskier than 
others. Also, as it is easier for the bundling system to be implemented if the duration 
of an episode can be defined, but more careful design is needed for conditions where 
the starting and ending points are less clear. 
More pilot studies are needed to examine the practical problems occurring 
from the implementation of bundling systems. So far, the experience from the U.S. 
implementation of bundling systems gives encouraging results for the reduction of 
costs and spending, and a wider implementation would provide more evidence for 
the scheme's potential. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
We have discussed a number of issues. A typology of bundling should involve more 
than the distinction between mixed and pure bundling. The literature has focused on 
bundling by a selling firm which can set a bundle price as well as separate prices. 
However bundling can also take alternative forms which depend on how the bundle 
isformed. Two such forms are “bundle setting” by the buyer, as in the case of 
procurement, as well as a “bundled exchange”, i.e., countertrade. Once bundling is 
considered in this light, then its implications have to be examined not only in terms 
of profit for the price setter, but also from the point of view of its effects on trading 
for the firms transacting with it. Furthermore, apart from some exceptions, the 
possibility of adverse selection, which has only received very limited coverage in the 
literature, introduces the need to examine the implications of bundling in alleviating 
questions of partner preferences. These could stem from quality uncertainties and 
hence further encourage trade, through the pairing of goods with different qualities. 
Hence such uncertainties introduce another potentially welfare-enhancing dimension 
of bundling. Finally, the other common perception typically found in the literature is 
the equal weighting of all goods bundled in the basket. Of course, this is not 
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necessarily the case in all instances. For example, the weights of types of 
programmes, such as documentaries, sports, movies, news, etc., bundled in the 
offerings by a TV provider can vary. This can lead to the question of how the firm 
will determine the weights of the goods within a bundle that it sells or wishes to buy, 
and the welfare implications of such decisions.  
The linear programming formulation discusses an approach that can be taken 
to obtain the price of a bundle of medical resources and the possible tension between 
a hospital and an insurance company. The theoretical discussion of bundling is 
followed by an application in the health care context. In particular, we discuss the 
implementation of bundling payments by Medicare, a social insurance programme in 
the United States. A number of pilot implementations of bundling in coronary artery 
bypass graft show positive effects in terms of reducing readmissions and health-care 
spending. However, these studies reveal also a number of drawbacks. There is a 
danger that hospitals will increase admissions in order to increase profit. They may 
also avoid sicker patients who increase costs. Furthermore, it may be difficult for 
bundling to work for chronic conditions where the starting and end points of care are 
less clear. In order to avoid unwanted consequences, strict quality targets need to be 
set and more pilot studies to be implemented. 
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